Selling the Name on the Schoolhouse Gate
The First Amendment and the Sale
of Public School Naming Rights
By Joseph Blocher

In the past five years, the sale of naming rights to public
school events and facilities has grown from fodder for
humor columnists into a nationwide, multimillion-dollar
enterprise.1 And although commercialism in schools is
nothing new, granting naming rights to public school facilities in exchange for remuneration raises novel and difficult
First Amendment problems that schools and their attorneys
will find increasingly difficult to ignore.2
The basic First Amendment issue arises out of schools’
understandable desire to choose the sponsors whose names
will adorn their facilities or events. In the past, naming
rights mostly involved “safe” sponsors like grocery stories
and banks. But these days the first would-be sponsor to show
up with a check may not be as innocuous as the local grocer.
For example, to the many schools that have recently taken
stands against the in-school sale of soft drinks and junk food
as a way to address concerns about childhood obesity, CocaCola and Nestlé may be sponsors non grata.3 Moreover,
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1998; Anita Powell, “Round Rock ISD Looks to Sell Stadium Name,”
Austin (Texas) American Statesman, October 30, 2003.
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Classrooms: Schoolhouse Commercializing Trends in the 1990’s, 6–7,
26 (Center for the Analysis of Commercialism in Educ, 1998); see
also Molnar, “Sixth Annual Report on Commercialism in Schools:
Cashing in on the Classroom,” Educational Leadership Magazine,
December 2003–January 2004, 79, reporting a “marked increase”
in six categories of schoolhouse commercialism from 2001–2002 to
2002–2003.
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October 11, 2006, (Redeye edition); Seema Mehta, “Sorry, Cupcake,
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experience in other areas of government sponsorship suggests that soft drink and candy companies are not the biggest
threat. Other undesirable sponsors—including advocates of
truly reprehensible political and social ideas—may be lurking, hoping, quite literally, to make a name for themselves
through a school sponsorship deal.4
Unfortunately, simply saying “no” to these sponsors may
be more difficult than school boards expect. The selection
of named sponsors raises concerns that can lead straight
from the schoolhouse to the courthouse: Once a school
has one named sponsor, other would-be sponsors may be
able to claim a First Amendment right to participate, just
as would-be speakers have a constitutional right to participate in other government-created forums. Unfortunately,
very few school board policies are currently attuned to this
First Amendment concern, leaving schools that turn down
a sponsor’s offer open to charges of viewpoint and content
discrimination and the very real possibility that they will
have to accept sponsors whose products or message they
oppose.
This article attempts to give schools and their attorneys
a means to avoid those charges. It is intended as a guide for
school boards and school attorneys trying to find their way
through the maze of First Amendment law surrounding
the sale of public school naming rights. Its purpose is not to
advocate for or against any particular approach to naming
rights; that decision is properly within the discretion of the
school board, whose members face the unenviable task of
balancing the need for funding with the myriad difficulties
that naming rights arrangements inevitably raise. The more
limited goal here is to help school boards maintain control
4. See John K. Eason, “Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions
in Charitable Naming Gifts: When Good Names Go Bad,” U.C.
Davis Law Review 38, no. 2 (2005): 375, 387, 394–402 (discussing
examples of “charitably inclined malfeasants whose names now
adorn various charitable institutions or facilities across the
nation”); Editorial, “County Should Have Rejected Nazis,” Portland
Oregonian, February 4, 2005 (Sunrise edition), reporting that the
county, fearing lawsuits, allowed the American Nazi Party to adopt
a stretch of highway.

© 2006 School of Government, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

2

School Law Bulletin • Fall 2006

over the names on their schools, whatever policies they
endorse.5
The first part of the article outlines the policy considerations surrounding school naming rights sales. This brief
overview demonstrates that while sales of school naming
rights have become increasingly common, such sales raise
difficult policy problems that may lead school officials to try
to reject sponsors they see as particularly undesirable. The
second part of the article explains how attempts to pick and
choose among potential sponsors may run into constitutional obstacles and briefly describes the First Amendment
categories implicated by such sales. It discusses the definition and governing standard of each category and suggests how school boards can best take advantage of those
standards to defend against First Amendment challenges to
sponsorship exclusions. The third, final part of the article
suggests other ways forward, such as policy moves that may
insulate schools from future sponsorship controversies.

Policy Considerations: The Pros and Cons
of Naming Rights Deals
The public school naming rights boom has been driven by
two forces: schools’ need for money and businesses’ need
for advertising.6 For school administrators seeking to fill
holes in their budgets, naming rights present a particularly
attractive potential revenue stream. Unlike other forms of
commercial sponsorship—such as exclusive pouring rights
for soft drink manufacturers or sponsored educational
materials—naming rights do not necessarily require schools
to change their daily schedules or curricula. They are, in
that sense, a “free” resource that every school possesses
(even if some schools’ names command a higher value on
the market than others). Paul Vallas, chief executive of the
Philadelphia public schools, is unabashed in his support
for naming rights deals: “My approach is Leave No Dollar Behind. There are tremendous needs in this system,
where 85 percent of the kids are below poverty level. I’m not
uncomfortable with corporations giving us money and getting their names on things. As long as it’s not inappropriate,

5. The article does not address in any detail the complicated
contractual issues surrounding naming rights deals. For more
information on those problems, see generally, Robert H. Thornburg,
Note, “Stadium Naming Rights: An Assessment of the Contract
and Trademark Issues Inherent to Both Professional and Collegiate
Stadiums,” Virginia Sports and Entertainment Law Journal 2, no.
2 (2003): 328; Debra E. Blum, “Donors Increasingly Use Legal
Contracts to Stipulate Demands on Charities,” Chronicle of
Philanthropy, March 21, 2002, 9.
6. Izzy Gould, “What’s in a Name? Extra Cash, Perhaps,” Tampa
Tribune, December 21, 2004 (Sports), 1; Molnar, Sponsored Schools,
10, noting that “[t]he justification for the sponsorship agreements
most often used by educators is the need for money.”

I don’t see any downside.”7 And indeed many school
officials insist that there is no downside. A recent survey
of North Carolina public school principals found that
73.9 percent “felt either mostly positive or somewhat positive about corporate sponsored events,” and 56.9 percent
said they would maintain their relationships with corporate
sponsors even if other funds were available to support the
activities currently underwritten by sponsors.8
Nonetheless, school naming rights arrangements do
implicate major policy concerns, the weight of which may
cause schools to try to limit either the scope of sponsorship
deals or the kinds of sponsors they deal with. Perhaps the
easiest to reject are offers from “bad name” sponsors such
as alcohol and tobacco companies or others whose products
are considered inappropriate for children.9 As one school
board president said, “Look, no one is suggesting us contracting with Delilah’s Den [a local gentleman’s club]. We
wouldn’t consider a product tie-in. . . . But everyone uses
food, so we contracted with a supermarket, a local supermarket. We’re talking to local banks, people like that.”10
Questionable commercial sponsors, however, are not the
only inappropriate possibility, and nightmare scenarios
may be more likely than schools suspect. The first group to
show up with a check may be a church, or a mosque, or the
National Rifle Association, or the Gay & Lesbian Alliance
Against Defamation, or some other group with a controversial identity or message that schools would rather avoid
endorsing.
Even an apparently “good” sponsor may carry unforeseen
but weighty baggage. In 1999 the Houston Astros sold the
naming rights of their new stadium to Enron, whose CEO,
Kenneth Lay, threw out the first pitch in the stadium. At
first, this seemed to be an excellent deal for all the parties:
the team received $100 million, and the company (not to
mention Lay himself) got the right to put its name on the
franchise for thirty years. But just two years later, the company’s spectacular collapse cost thousands of Houstonians
their jobs and Lay faced charges for fraud and conspiracy.11
Nor were the Astros the only recipients of Lay’s problematic

7. Quoted in Tamar Lewin, “In Public Schools, the Name Game
As a Donor Lure,” New York Times, January 26, 2006.
8. Joseph Di Bona et al., “Commercialism in North Carolina
High Schools: A Survey of Principals’ Perceptions,” Peabody Journal
of Education 78, no. 2 (2003): 41, 52, 56, 58.
9. See, e.g., Mark Zaloudek, “Should Donors Get to Name Public
Schools?” Sarasota Herald-Tribune, March 21, 2005, reporting that
Philadelphia public schools refuse naming rights deals with alcohol
or tobacco companies.
10. Robert Strauss, “Education: P.S. (Your Name Here),” New
York Times, December 16, 2001 (New Jersey Weekly).
11. The naming rights were later resold to Minute Maid, a
subsidiary of Coca-Cola, which paid $100 million for twenty-eight
years of naming rights.
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largesse. He also donated $1.1 million to his alma mater, the
University of Missouri, to endow the Kenneth L. Lay Chair
in Economics. When the company collapsed and Lay’s own
business ethics were called into serious question, the university was left with a major problem—and a still-unfilled
professorship—which it has yet to resolve.12 Other, equally
uncomfortable examples are not hard to find.
Finally, as noted above, many people oppose commercial
deals that expose students to products like sugary or fatty
snack foods, which may lead many schools to avoid naming
rights deals with their purveyors.13 And, as the heated battles over commercial activity in schools have demonstrated,
even when the products themselves are unobjectionable,
many people oppose naming rights deals on the grounds
that schools that accept them are “selling out” to commercial sponsors and cheapening the “honor bestowed on
long-time public servants and civic leaders when a facility is named for them.” 14 Opponents also argue that such
deals expose vulnerable children to advertising that they
are unable to filter out and interfere with the schools’ core
educational missions.15 Even when naming rights avoid
these pitfalls, they can implicate other broad policy concerns; they might threaten interschool equity by channeling
money to schools in affluent areas where students and their
parents have more disposable income to spend on the sponsor’s products.16 Finally, some critics have alleged that the
sale of naming rights privatizes civic responsibility, making
schools dependent on corporate dollars and making taxpayers less likely to vote for school funding measures.17

12. As reported by MSNBC on May 26, 2006, “Lay’s Alma Mater
Struggles with Donation: Seeks ‘Alternative Use’ for Stock Profits
Instead of Economics Position.”
13. See Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Issue Brief, “The Role
of Media in Childhood Obesity” (October 2004), www.kff.org/
entmedia/entmedia022404pkg.cfm.
14. See, e.g., Ruth Sheehan, “Too Late to Cry ‘Sellout,’” Raleigh
News and Observer, January 20, 2003; Larry King, “The WorldHerald’s Priority Is What Best Serves the Readers,” Omaha World
Herald, August 10, 2003, explaining the newspaper’s decision to
call a convention center by its popular name despite a recent sale of
naming rights.
15. Citizens’ Campaign for Commercial-Free Schools, “What’s
Wrong with Commercializing the Public Schools?” (undated), www.
scn.org/cccs/arguments.html (last visited August 16, 2007). See also
Eason, “Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in Charitable
Naming Gifts,” 399.
16. See Randy Krebs, “Our View: Schools Should Think before
Entering Deal for Naming Rights,” St. Cloud (Minn.) Times, July
19, 2005, noting that a technology company was focusing its school
sponsorship efforts on “the nation’s wealthiest school districts.”
17. Christine McDonald, “Got Cash? Buy School Name: To
Ease Tight Budgets, Plymouth-Canton, Others Ponder Sale of
Naming Rights to Buildings, Events,” Detroit News, June 27, 2005;
ERIC Clearinghouse for Educational Management, “Business
Partnerships with Schools,” Policy Report No. 2 (Fall 2001): 10.
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As these competing policy concerns illustrate, school
boards who choose to engage in naming rights deals are
often caught between the need to secure funding and the
need to assuage citizens’ concerns about the scope and content of the deals. School administrators (and their attorneys)
will probably attempt to navigate these difficult straits by
limiting the kinds of sponsors to whom they will sell naming rights, rejecting sponsors whose identities, products, or
messages they do not endorse. But, although this could be
a wise policy, it is one the First Amendment might foreclose.

The Relevance of the First Amendment
Rejecting a would-be sponsor is not as simple as refusing
to cash its check. Lurking in discussions of government
sponsorship deals is a set of First Amendment concerns
that could force schools to accept naming rights deals with
sponsors they want to avoid. Specifically, the First Amendment may limit schools’ ability to reject sponsors based
on their identity or message. School naming rights are
undoubtedly a form of “speech,” even if the precise message and speaker are somewhat unclear. Indeed, courts have
already recognized a First Amendment right to participate
in similar government sponsorship programs, suggesting
that would-be school sponsors could also find traction for
their claims.
The horror stories from these government sponsorship
cases should send shivers down the spine of any school
board attorney. In a recent string of cases, the Ku Klux
Klan tried to become an acknowledged sponsor of a public
radio station in Missouri and sought to get its name on
Adopt-a-Highway signs across the country.18 Predictably,
the government officials responsible for these programs
refused to accept the Klan’s offer of participation. And,
perhaps just as predictably, the Klan has repeatedly sued on
First Amendment grounds. While it has not been successful
in all its challenges, it did win the right to adopt a stretch
of Missouri roadway—perhaps a portent of the ultimate
nightmare for schools.19

18. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the University of
Missouri, 203 F.3d 1085, 1094 (8th Cir. 2000); Cuffley v. Mickes,
208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000).
19. Cuffley was decided on Equal Protection grounds, but the
court specifically noted that “[w]hether this claim arises under the
Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment, it is clear that the
State may not deny access to the Adopt-A-Highway program based
on the applicant’s views.” Id. at 760 n.3. But see Texas v. Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
state’s reason for denying the Klan’s application to adopt a portion
of highway outside a public housing project was reasonable and
viewpoint neutral because the state sought to prevent the Klan
from intimidating residents and frustrating a federal desegregation
order).

© 2006 School of Government, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

4

School Law Bulletin • Fall 2006

There are not yet any reported cases of sponsors suing
schools to force their names onto school facilities. This is
most likely a reflection of the fact that school naming rights
policies have not been around long enough to give rise to
such cases. They are all but inevitable in the future as naming rights policies become more common and the stakes on
both sides rise. But although First Amendment litigation
over school naming rights seems inevitable, neither the
outcome of that litigation nor even the First Amendment
standards that will govern it is quite so clear. Despite the
simplicity of the First Amendment’s language—“Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of Speech” 20—
it accords different levels of protection to different kinds of
speech, depending on the speaker, the message, and where
the speech occurs.21 As a result, there are a variety of different First Amendment tests governing different forms of
speech, including sponsorship deals like school naming
rights.
Unfortunately, school naming rights do not easily fit
within any one of these tests, as it is difficult to establish
who is “speaking” through a paid naming rights arrangement, what that speaker is saying, and in what forum the
speech takes place. The overview below considers the three
areas of First Amendment law that appear to be most relevant to school naming rights: government speech, commercial speech, and forum analysis. For each category,
the discussion identifies the scope of the category (i.e., the
definition that a naming rights deal would have to satisfy to
fall within its scope); describes the governing standard (the
hurdle a school would have to clear to regulate the naming
rights); and, finally, offers suggestions of ways school attorneys can best take advantage of the category.

GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Government speech is an ill-defined and somewhat controversial constitutional category that, despite its uncertain

20. U.S. Const. amend. 1.
21. Many scholars have called for a more evenhanded application
of the amendment. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson and William G.
Buss, “The Many Faces of Government Speech,” Iowa Law Review
86 (2001): 1377, 1384 (2001) (arguing that “there is no basis or
need for any special form of privilege or immunity for government
speech”); Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, “Who’s Afraid of
Commercial Speech?” Virginia Law Review 76 (1990): 627 (arguing
that commercial speech should be entitled to full First Amendment
protection); William V. Van Alstyne, “To What Extent Does the
Power of Government to Determine the Boundaries and Conditions
of Lawful Commerce Permit Government to Declare Who May
Advertise and Who May Not?” Emory Law Journal 51 (2002): 1513,
1554 (2002) (“[F]rom one quite reasonable view one might well
argue (as will be done here) that there is far less reason in this area
(‘commerce’) than in others (e.g., ‘politics’?) to depart from strict
scrutiny review.”).

origins, has a fair amount of common sense appeal.22 In
essence, it recognizes that the government (schools and
school boards for the purposes of this article) can at times
be a “speaker” and that when the government speaks it is
generally entitled to say what it wants.
Definition of government speech
The Supreme Court has never established a specific definition of government speech, but the development of the doctrine suggests the concerns and characteristics that shaped
it. The category of government speech, such as it is, arose in
a series of cases involving government subsidies to private
actors. The seminal case is Rust v. Sullivan,23 in which the
Supreme Court upheld Title X of the Public Health Services
Act, which withholds government funds from clinics that
provide information about abortion. Rejecting the clinics’
First Amendment challenge, the Court held that “[t]he government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding
an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.” 24
Subsequent cases applying Rust have confirmed that the
government may “speak” through its support of private
actors. Thus, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, the Supreme Court held that that a
public university could not refuse to fund student publications that expressed belief in a deity.25 And in Legal Services
Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court again read Rust as protecting
the government’s right to engage in viewpoint discrimination when it speaks on its own behalf, but not when it subsidizes private speakers.26 The relevant question in all cases
22. Note, “The Curious Relationship between the Compelled
Speech and Government Speech Doctrines,” Harvard Law Review
117, no. 7 (2004): 2411, 2432 (“The government speech line of cases
remains the ugly stepchild of First Amendment doctrine.”). The
pioneering work arguing for greater recognition of government as a
creator of speech, and not just its regulator, is Mark G. Yudof, When
Government Speaks: Politics, Law, and Government Expression in
America (Berkeley, Calif., 1983).
23. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Earlier cases implicitly reached the
conclusion that Rust eventually adopted. See, e.g., Muir v. Alabama
Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1044 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
banc).
24. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
25. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Although scholars tend to identify
Rosenberger as a pillar of government speech doctrine, the Court
actually approached the case through the lens of forum analysis. Id.
at 829–31.
26. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (overturning statute providing
government funding for public interest lawyers on condition
that they not challenge welfare policy). See also Commonwealth
v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (1895) (Holmes, J.), aff ’d sub nom Davis v.
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897) (“For the legislature absolutely
or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public
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appears to be whether the message sent can properly be
characterized as the government’s.27
The standard governing government speech
Rust and its progeny made it clear that when the government speaks, it may control its own message—it may select
its viewpoint or content—without running afoul of the
First Amendment. In the context of naming rights, this
suggests that, to the degree that naming rights are “government speech,” schools may pick and choose among sponsors
based on their message and viewpoint.
The most subtle distinction—one that courts and scholars
have struggled mightily to identify and apply—is between
situations in which the government gives support to private
speakers to deliver the government’s message and those in
which it subsidizes private speakers with their own messages. In the latter case, as in Velazquez, the government
may not engage in viewpoint discrimination.
Characterizing naming rights as government speech
Government speech, because it gives schools the ability to
express a viewpoint, is obviously a desirable category from
the schools’ perspective. It allows them to exercise broad
control over the names on their buildings, irrespective of
sponsors’ own purported free speech claims. As the analysis
above makes clear, the relevant question in any government
speech analysis is whether the message is the government’s.
So long as naming rights are seen as a form of government
speech—that is, so long as they deliver the government’s
message—schools have wide discretion to limit the deals
they accept.
Schools hoping to put their naming rights in the government speech category would do well to “claim” their names.
There are many ways to do so; the simplest is to limit the
type and number of sponsors who are allowed to participate
in a naming rights program in the first place. If in the past a
school or school district has essentially opened its doors to
all would-be sponsors without scrutinizing their messages
or identities, it will find it exceedingly difficult to claim
in future cases that the choice of a name is its own act of
speech.28 Thus, a school that exerts control over its naming

park is no more an infringement of rights of a member of the public
than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in the house.”). But
see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
27. “The Curious Relationship between the Compelled Speech
and Government Speech Doctrines,” 2412 (“[P]laintiffs have
uniformly been willing to accept Rust’s definition of the battlefield:
that is, the only question to be answered is the factual one of who is
speaking.”).
28. Indeed, a school in this situation may have already
inadvertently created a public forum—described in more detail
below—and thus have lost control over sponsorship almost entirely.

5

rights in the present will increase the control it can exert in
the future.
An even better way to “claim” the school’s name is
through written policies and consistent practices that treat
the name as part of the school’s message or curriculum.
Some policies state specifically that the school’s name sends
an important message about the school.29 Other naming
policies explicitly recognize, as the Newton Conover school
board has done, that “naming or renaming a facility [is] a
significant endeavor since the name of a facility can reflect
upon the students, staff, school district and community.”30
Courts are especially solicitous of restrictions on “speech”
at school when they are presented as necessary to advance
the school’s curricular and educational needs (which themselves seem to be a form of speech). Schools whose naming
rights policies suggest the curricular value of naming rights
will thus prove especially successful at earning the “government speech” tag. For example, Rochester, New York, has a
naming rights policy that explicitly connects the naming of
schools to the schools’ educational mission.
This policy is based upon the belief that it is important
that the students and public know of the many contributions of many Rochester leaders of the past and
other national heroes, and that this knowledge can be
more strongly imprinted through classroom discussion and projects related to school names.31
Even though courts have more often considered school curricula under the rubric of forum analysis (discussed below)
than as government speech, the lesson for school boards
and their attorneys is the same: Claiming the message as the
school’s own is the best way to control it.
It is also possible that naming rights might be characterized as government speech because they amount to a
government endorsement of the named sponsor. Inasmuch
as a school, by allowing a corporate or other sponsor to
put its name on school facilities, is effectively sending an
29. See, e.g., Carteret County (N.C.) Pub. School System,
Regulation FF, “Naming School Facilities” (revised January
2006): “The naming or renaming of a school or the creation of a
commemorative or memorial is a matter deserving the thoughtful
attention of the Board of Education,” www.carteretcountyschools.
org/hr/Facilities%20Development.pdf; Cobb County (Ga.)
School District, Administrative Rule FF, “Naming of School
Facilities” (revised December 8, 2005): “The Cobb County School
District . . . recognizes that the official names of its facilities are vital
to their public image,” www.cobbk12.org/centraloffice/adminrules/
F_Rules/Rule%20FF.htm.
30. Newton Conover (N.C.) Board of Education, Policy 7302,
“Naming School Facilities,” www.nccs.k12.nc.us/Policy/Policy7000.
doc.
31. Rochester City School Board, Policy Manual 7500, “Naming
New Facilities” (revised August 20, 1998), www.rcsdk12.org/BOE/
PM/PM%20pdfs/7000/7500%20Naming%20Facilities.pdf.

© 2006 School of Government, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

6

School Law Bulletin • Fall 2006

approving message about the sponsor—“This sponsor is
upstanding enough for us to associate ourselves with it”—
the choice of sponsors must also be considered a form of
government speech.32 In many ways this situation is analogous to that of public broadcasters such as National Public
Radio, whose editorial decisions have been characterized as
a form of speech.33
This article does not address in any detail one final variant on the government speech inquiry: the possibility that
school naming rights arrangements might give rise to a
compelled speech claim by students who object to the name
they are forced to carry around on their transcripts or uniforms. Student opposition to schoolhouse commercialism
has already made headlines—perhaps most famously when
a high school student was suspended for wearing a Pepsi
shirt to a “Coke Day” rally—demonstrating that some students see sponsorship as important enough to oppose.34 The
Supreme Court has already ruled in prior student speech
cases that there is no constitutionally significant difference between compelled speech and compelled silence.35
Creative First Amendment lawyers may therefore challenge
school naming rights arrangements based on compelledspeech grounds as well.

COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Of course, schools are not the only potential speakers
implicated by school naming rights arrangements. Indeed,
many observers might consider the sponsor—the organization that pays to have its name placed on the building—as

32. See Knights of KKK and Nathan Robb v. Arkansas State
Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 807 F. Supp. 1427, 1436 (W.D. Ark. 1992)
(“If nothing else, they, by picking up or having their members or
employees pick up litter, thus keeping their adopted portion of the
highway beautiful and litter free, are saying or hoping to say to
the travelling public by actions and deeds, and through the signs
constructed by the State of Arkansas, that they are ‘good’ and
environmentally conscious, and thus good citizens and politically
and socially correct.”); Knights of the KKK v. Curators of the
University of Missouri [—St. Louis], 203 F.3d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir.
2000) (“KWMU’s underwriting acknowledgments constitute
governmental speech on the part of UMSL.”).
33. In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,
for example, the Court found that “when a public broadcaster
exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of
its programming, it engages in speech activity.” 523 U.S. 666, 674
(1998); see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,
585–86 (1998) (finding that viewpoint neutrality is not required in
selection of art exhibits for public funding).
34. See, e.g., Jingle Davis, “No Coke, Pepsi: Rebel without a
Pause,” Atlanta Constitution, March 26, 1998 (Constitution edition);
Barry Saunders, “OK, Class—Line Up, Dress Right, and Salute the
Image,” Raleigh News and Observer, March 28, 1998.
35. E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding
that the First Amendment’s guarantees “include both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all”).

the speaker. The message that sponsor would most likely
send is a commercial one; that is, one encouraging people
to purchase its products or services. And, in a somewhat
unpredictable line of cases, the Supreme Court has gradually extended First Amendment protection to this kind of
commercial speech while refusing to settle on a single definition for the category. This section attempts to sketch the
boundaries of commercial speech and explain the standard
that governs it.
The law of commercial speech has recently been defined
by two, apparently competing but actually complementary,
trends: (1) a progressive narrowing of the category of commercial speech, and (2) a progressive strengthening of the
protections accorded to it. The combined effect of these
trends is to increase the protections available for seemingly
commercial speech. Such protection can be achieved either
by entirely avoiding the commercial label—the best way
to protect commercial speech, after all, is to not label it as
such—or by requiring the government regulating commercial speech to carry a heavy justificatory burden.
The contracting definition of commercial speech
The Court has never decided on a single definition of
commercial speech, although it has invoked various factors and ad hoc tests.36 Perhaps the first effort was Justice
Blackmun’s opinion in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Council, which suggested that “commercial speech” is speech that does “‘no more than propose a
commercial transaction.’” 37 Later opinions tended to follow
this approach, giving full First Amendment protection (by
not classifying their messages as commercial speech) to a
variety of “mixed” cases involving both commercial and
noncommercial messages.38

36. Scholars attribute this imprecision to the inherent difficulties
of classifying commercial speech. See. e.g., Nat Stern, “In Defense
of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech,” Maryland. Law
Review 58, no. 1 (1999): 55, 146 (“The Supreme Court’s inability
to encase commercial speech within unwavering defi nitional
boundaries is not the product of ineptitude, but rather the
unavoidable incident of commercial speech’s position at the blurry
crossroads of expressive and economic activity.”); Robert Post, “The
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech,” UCLA Law Review 48
(October 2000): 1, 7 (“The impossibility of uniquely identifying the
attributes of commercial speech has been much noted.”).
37. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Com. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1976));
see also Thomas C. Goldstein, “Nike v. Kasky and the Definition of
‘Commercial Speech,’ in Cato Supreme Court Review, 2002–2003,
ed. James L. Swanson (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute), 72,
referring to Blackmun’s as the “most often-repeated” definition of
commercial speech the Court has offered.
38. E.g., Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781,
789, 798 (1988).
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The current prevailing definition of commercial speech is
essentially a non-test established by the Supreme Court in
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. In that case, the Court
upheld the “‘common-sense’ distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an
area traditionally subject to government regulation, and
other varieties of speech.”39 The Court has continued to use
this approach while acknowledging its imprecision.40
Commercial speech law is currently in a state of flux, and
the Supreme Court has recently indicated that it may be
considering a bit of housecleaning. In 2004 the California
Supreme Court decided Kasky v. Nike,41 a case arising from
a private citizen’s criticism of the Nike Corporation for
allegedly engaging in sweatshop abuse in its overseas factories. The criticism itself was undoubtedly fully protected,
noncommercial speech. Nike responded to it with “editorial
advertisements,” press releases, and letters to newspapers
and universities.42 One of the issues in the case was whether
these publicized responses were commercial speech.
The California Supreme Court found that they were,
because (1) the speaker (Nike) was likely to be engaged in
commerce, (2) the intended audience were actual or potential buyers, and (3) the actual message made representations
of fact about Nike’s business operations, products, or services.43 The decision caused enormous controversy in the
academic community, where scholars were almost unanimous in their condemnation and their calls for the U.S.
Supreme Court to intervene.44 The Court did, granting certiorari and arousing hope that it might use the opportunity
to establish a clear definition of commercial speech. But the
Court then dismissed the writ of certiorari (over dissents
from Justices Kennedy and Breyer), thus leaving commercial speech itself ill-defined.45

39. Bolger, 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
40. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993)
(“[A]mbiguities may exist at the margins of the category of
commercial speech.”); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (acknowledging “the difficulty of drawing
bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct
category”).
41. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537
U.S. 1099, and cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 564 (2003).
42. Goldstein, “Nike v. Kasky,” 65.
43. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 258; 315, see also Central Hudson Gas &
Electric v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980)
(differentiating between “direct comments on public issues”
and statements about public policy “made only in the context of
commercial transactions”).
44. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover, “The
Landmark Free-Speech Case That Wasn’t: The Nike v. Kasky
Story,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 54 (Summer 2004): 965;
Goldstein, “Nike v. Kasky.”
45. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 665 (2003).
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Expanding protections for commercial speech
For most of this history, commercial speech received no
First Amendment protection at all.46 But beginning with
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, the Supreme Court began to recognize commercial
speech (even basic advertising) as a form of speech entitled
to some First Amendment protection, albeit not the same
level of protection accorded to “pure” speech.47
Governmental restrictions on commercial speech are
now governed by a four-part test created by the Supreme
Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service
Commission. The first part of the test asks whether the
speech being regulated “concerns lawful activity and [is
not] misleading.”48 If the speech fails this initial inquiry,
it receives no First Amendment protection at all.49 If it
passes, the second prong then assesses whether the government interest in the speech is “substantial.” 50 The third asks
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted; and the fourth, and final, prong measures
the breadth of the regulation to see if it is more extensive
than is necessary to serve the stated interest.51 Though the
second and third prongs are comparatively easy for a regulation to meet,52 the final prong has become an increasingly
sizeable obstacle.53
Central Hudson endures as a test, but its application has
not always been even-handed. In Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the Supreme Court
held that Puerto Rico could ban all outdoor advertising of
casinos.54 But more recently, in 44 Liquormart, the Court

46. Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance forbidding distribution
of printed handbills for commercial advertising in the streets, even
though half of the handbill was devoted to a nominally political
protest).
47. Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
48. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
49. Hoff man Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (holding
that the government may entirely ban commercial speech that
proposes illegal transactions); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)
(upholding statute prohibiting the practice of optometry under
misleading names).
50. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
51. Id.
52. The Court has upheld as valid government interests the
promotion of energy conservation, id. at 566; the prevention of
drunkenness, 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996);
and the protection of public safety in the context of compounded
drugs, Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
53. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569–72. See also
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (citing
Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995), and striking
down state restriction on tobacco advertising).
54. 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986) (“In short, we conclude that the
statute and regulations at issue in this case, as construed by the
Superior Court, pass muster under each prong of the Central
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held that a complete ban on price advertising of liquor failed
both the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson.55
In summary, at the same time as it has trimmed the
definition of commercial speech—thus leaving other,
seemingly commercial speech in the full protection of the
First Amendment—the Supreme Court has also expanded
the protections given to speech it still categorizes as
commercial.56
Naming rights as commercial speech:
A second-best option
Although government speech is, from the schools’ perspective, the most desirable category for naming rights—
carrying with it almost unlimited power to select and
reject sponsors—the commercial speech category also
has its advantages. In spite of the increasing protection
given to commercial speech—and its increasingly narrow
definition—schools that can successfully characterize their
naming rights arrangements as the sponsors’ commercial
speech will retain some power to reject sponsors under the
Central Hudson test.
Naturally, the best way for schools to argue that naming
rights are commercial speech is to highlight the various
indicia of advertising and commercialism contemplated in
Bolger. So, for example, the label “Phil Knight High School”
might not be considered commercial speech, even though
the Nike Corporation (which Phil Knight founded) paid
for the naming rights. But “Nike Gymnasium” would present a closer question, since use of the company’s name—
particularly in conjunction with a place and activities where
its products are used—is more suggestive of commercial
intent, which is a relevant consideration under Bolger and
even more so under the controversial Kasky test. Similarly,
if the trademark Nike swoosh and the words “Just Do It”
were part of the sponsorship arrangement, the arrangement
would be seen as even more commercial.
This line of argument may seem somewhat odd, given
that schools (faced with the anticommercialism sentiment
described above) probably would not otherwise stress the
commercial nature of their naming rights arrangements.
Most would prefer—for public relations purposes, at least—
to characterize them as charitable contributions. And, just
as ironically, sponsors might find that the weight of their
arguments against characterizing naming rights as government speech actually pushes them toward the commercial
Hudson test. We therefore hold that the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico properly rejected appellant’s First Amendment claim.”).
55. 517 U.S. at 505–08.
56. See Stern, “In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of
Commercial Speech,” 72: “The splintered opinions in 44 Liquormart
should not obscure the fact that this decision heralded a more
protective attitude toward commercial speech.”

speech category, where they are still entitled to at least some
limited protections. Thus in terms of the legal category of
commercial speech, the incentives are somewhat reversed:
schools are better served when naming rights are categorized as commercial because they retain greater authority
to regulate them, whereas sponsors have a correspondingly
larger incentive to stress the noncommercial aspects of the
deals because they receive more First Amendment protection under the “pure” noncommercial category.
If a naming rights arrangement is classified as commercial speech, any regulations governing naming rights would
very likely pass the four-prong test laid out in Central Hudson. The first prong of the test would probably be irrelevant,
since most sponsors’ names are presumably legal and not
“misleading.” The second prong—requiring the government
to show a substantial interest—would not present a major
hurdle for schools, because they could assert that such regulations further the government’s interest in education—one
of the most “substantial” government interests of all.57
In addressing the third prong of Central Hudson—which
asks whether the regulation at issue directly advances the
government interest asserted—schools could rely on existing research about the negative impact of advertising and
commercialism on students’ ability to learn. The decadesold battles over commercialism in schools have produced
ample information from which to draw.58
The fourth prong of Central Hudson—measuring the
potential overbreadth of the regulation—might present
a more significant obstacle. Prior to the Supreme Court’s
1996 decision in 44 Liquormart, overbreadth was almost
impossible to establish, and the Court repeatedly upheld
total bans on entire classes of advertisements.59 In 44
57. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003)
(internal citations omitted) (“We have repeatedly acknowledged
the overriding importance of preparing students for work and
citizenship, describing education as pivotal to ‘sustaining our
political and cultural heritage’ with a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of society.”).
58. See above, notes 15–20 and accompanying text. See also Seth
Grossman, Comment, “Grand Theft Oreo: The Constitutionality of
Advergame Regulation,” Yale Law Journal 115 (October 2005): 227,
234 (arguing that regulation of snack food “advergames” should
pass the third prong of Central Hudson “so long as the government
carefully and thoroughly compiles such evidence of the link
between advergames and the health of children”).
59. Compare Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344 (holding that under
Central Hudson it was “up to the legislature” to reduce gambling
by suppressing in-state casino advertising rather than by applying
some less speech-restrictive policy) with 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S.
at 509 (“Given our longstanding hostility to commercial speech
regulation of this type, Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it
was ‘up to the legislature’ to choose suppression over a less speechrestrictive policy.”). See also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508–13 (White, J.,
joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ) (finding that total
ban on outdoor advertising passed all prongs of Central Hudson,
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Liquormart, however, the Court revived the fourth prong
of Central Hudson by making it clear that even though
the narrowness inquiry is less harsh than strict scrutiny, it
nonetheless requires the state to shoulder a “heavy burden
of justifying its complete ban on price advertising.” 60 To
carry that burden, schools might turn back to the evidence
they marshaled to meet the second prong. Although courts
have yet to explicitly note a connection between the second
and fourth prongs of Central Hudson, logic suggests that it
might exist. For example, in the pre-Central Hudson case of
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, the Supreme Court
found that a broad ban preventing lawyers from soliciting
clients in person was a permissible regulation of commercial speech, given the important governmental interest in
protecting those solicited from undue pressure.61
Although the commercial speech inquiry is relatively
fact-intensive and it is correspondingly difficult to generalize about whether the courts will consider a particular
naming rights arrangement to be commercial speech, the
discussion here has illuminated some general lessons. Generally, school attorneys hoping to argue that a particular
naming rights deal falls within the commercial speech
category (thus preserving the school’s broad authority to
pick and choose among sponsors), would do well to stress
its commercial aspects, including the identity of the sponsor
and whether the intended audience (students, for example)
are actual or potential buyers.62

9

thanks (for example, a plaque displaying the donor’s name),
making the exchange very similar to other noncommercial
donor-donee relationships. If naming rights are characterized as this kind of noncommercial, nongovernmental
speech, sponsors will be entitled to the full protection of the
First Amendment and restrictions on their speech will have
to meet the forum analysis tests governing pure speech.
Defining the forum
For First Amendment purposes, there are three different
forums—public forums, nonpublic forums, and limited
public forums—and the power of the government to regulate pure speech depends on the forum in which the speech
takes place.63
Traditional public forums are areas “which the State
has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity.” 64 The government has little power to regulate
speech in such forums. The only permissible restrictions
are content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions or
content-based restrictions that are narrowly drawn to serve
a compelling state interest.65 Fortunately for school boards,
naming rights policies are unlikely to create public forums.
Nevertheless, if a school board were to fail to exercise control over its sponsors, it might find itself the unsuspecting
custodian of a public forum.66
By contrast, in nonpublic forums such as military
bases and the sidewalks outside post offices, the government has broad power to regulate speech.67 Restrictions

FORUM ANALYSIS
It is of course possible that schools or sponsors will characterize school naming rights as neither government speech
nor commercial speech but as something else entirely:
noncommercial speech on the part of the sponsors. After
all, schools and sponsors often refer to such arrangements
as charitable donations reciprocated by the school’s show of

even though it failed on other First Amendment grounds); 44
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 508 (citing Metromedia for the proposition
that “Our commercial speech cases recognize some room for the
exercise of legislative judgment.”).
60. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 516.
61. Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (“Under our view of the
State’s interest in averting harm by prohibiting solicitation in
circumstances where it is likely to occur, the absence of explicit
proof or findings of harm or injury is immaterial. The facts in
this case . . . demonstrate the need for prophylactic regulation in
furtherance of the State’s interest in protecting the lay public.”).
But see In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (finding that an ACLU
lawyer’s letter to a group of indigent political clients falls within
the “generous zone of First Amendment protections reserved for
associational freedoms” and that “[w]here political expression or
association is at issue, this Court has not tolerated the degree of
imprecision that often characterized government regulation of the
conduct of commercial affairs”).
62. Kasky, 45 P.3d 243, 258 (Cal. 2002).

63. For the purposes of forum analysis, “place” includes not
just physical property but even such channels of communications
as intraschool mail systems. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (“The SAF
is a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic
sense, but the same principles are applicable.”) (internal citations
omitted); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 801 (1985) (treating charitable contribution fund as property
for purposes of forum analysis); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (describing forum analysis).
64. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
65. Id.; Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 678 (1992) (upholding reasonable restrictions on distribution
of religious literature and solicitation in an airport terminal, which
is not a traditional public forum); Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788 (holding
that Combined Federal Campaign created a nonpublic forum in
which restrictions must be reasonable and that refusal to allow
certain advocacy groups to participate in that forum abridged their
First Amendment Rights).
66. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (holding that a silent
vigil in a public library is protected, while a noisy and disruptive
demonstration would not be); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (finding that students have a First
Amendment-protected right to wear black armbands as a protest,
unless they result in disruption of school).
67. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976); United States
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (suggesting existence of
nonpublic forum but ultimately resolving case on other grounds).
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are acceptable, even if based on subject matter or speaker
identity, so long as they are “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”68 In
other words, the First Amendment does not prohibit the
viewpoint-neutral exclusion of speakers who would hinder
the purpose of the nonpublic forum.69 A naming rights
policy might create a nonpublic forum by simply failing to
provide for a sponsor’s expressive activity.70
The most likely forum categorization for naming rights
policies, however, is the limited public forum, a slightly
amorphous category that courts have identified as existing
when the government opens a forum for expressive activity
and intentionally makes it “generally available” to a certain
class of speakers.71 In limited forums, the government can
restrict speech based on subject matter and speaker identity,
but the restrictions themselves must nonetheless be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest
while leaving open ample alternatives.”72
Within the broad category of the limited public forum,
the Supreme Court has applied an especially deferential
standard to regulations on speech in schools, recognizing that First Amendment claims must be considered “in
light of the special characteristics of the school environ-

68. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
69. This fact of course raises the possibility that government
actors might try to justify as “viewpoint-neutral” an otherwise
invalid viewpoint-based restriction by pointing instead to the
disruptive reaction caused by expression of that viewpoint. A school
board, for example, might reject a controversial sponsor based on
disruption that opposition to the sponsor would create. In the words
of one court, though, “the First Amendment knows no heckler’s
veto.” Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2004)
(holding that possible dangerous public reaction is insufficient
rationale to bar the Ku Klux Klan from the Adopt a Highway
Program).
70. See DeLoretto v. Downy Unified Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 958,
968–69 (9th Cir. 1999) (inferring and upholding existence of a
“commercial only” policy that created a nonpublic forum in a school
that had only ever accepted commercial advertisements and later
refused to post the Ten Commandments); Mary Jean Dolan, “The
Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships:
New Extensions of Government Speech,” Hastings Constitutional
Law Quarterly 31 (Winter 2004): 71, 126 (“In choosing sponsors and
partners, government does not intend to open a forum for private
speech, but rather to obtain assistance to leverage its own ability to
act.”).
71. See, generally, Ronnie J. Fischer, “‘What’s in a Name?’: An
Attempt to Resolve the ‘Analytic Ambiguity’ of the Designated and
Limited Public Fora,” Dickinson Law Review 107 (Winter 2003): 639;
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678–79.
72. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49; Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trustees
of Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 562 (E.D. Va. 1998) (enjoining, on
First Amendment grounds, library trustees from enforcing policy
on Internet sexual harassment prohibiting access to certain contentbased categories of Internet publications).

ment.” 73 The two leading cases—familiar to any school
attorney—are Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School and Hazelwood School District v. Kulhmeier. In
Tinker, the Court held that “[n]either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”74 The Court found that
a school’s prohibition on antiwar armbands violated the
First Amendment and that the school’s fear of possible disturbance caused by the armbands was not enough, by itself,
to justify the ban. Hazelwood, however, confirmed that
in certain situations a school can restrict student speech,
particularly when the speech would otherwise interfere
with the educational mission of the school. Hazelwood thus
stands for the proposition that materials to which students
might be exposed can be regulated in some circumstances,
especially for curricular purposes.75 Importantly for the
present discussion, Hazelwood appears to encompass other
means of expression—presumably including school names
themselves—that bear the imprimatur of the school.76
The application of forum analysis does appear to depend
somewhat on the speaker’s identity, at least when the speech
is religious. In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District, the Supreme Court held that after-school use
of school property created a limited forum but nonetheless
struck down as viewpoint discrimination a school’s ban on
after-school religious activities.77 Lamb’s Chapel can probably be explained as a product of the Court’s solicitousness
of religious freedom. It suggests that religious sponsors represent a “viewpoint” rather than a “subject matter” and thus
that regulations restricting their speech are bound to fail.

The Way Forward
Naturally, it is difficult to predict the legal results of stillunfiled cases challenging nonexistent naming rights policies. Indeed, the most important take-home point of this
article is that schools must be aware of the First Amend73. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)
(quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
74. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
75. 484 U.S. at 261. This point regarding curriculum obviously
raises a parallel with the earlier discussion of naming rights as
curricula (see n. 31 and accompanying text above), which cast their
curricular value as indicative of government speech. Nevertheless,
as Bezanson and Buss write, Hazelwood “did not rest on a clearly
defined idea of government speech, ” but rather “on doctrines
premised on government’s role as regulator.” Randall P. Bezanson
and William G. Buss, “The Many Faces of Government Speech,”
86 Iowa Law Review 86 (August 2001): 1377, 1418. See also Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding
that a school need not tolerate student speech that interferes with its
“basic educational mission”).
76. 484 U.S. at 269.
77. 508 U.S. 384, 392–94 (1993).
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ment implications of naming rights—an awareness that
few schools have demonstrated thus far. How schools can
address those concerns—balancing the competing policy
considerations for and against naming rights without running afoul of the First Amendment—is a matter for the
sound discretion of individual school boards and their
attorneys. Nevertheless, some general observations and
recommendations are possible.

THE NEED FOR POLICIES
By far the most troubling trend in school naming rights is
the degree to which schools seem to be operating without
reference to any written policies whatsoever. Unlike universities, which generally have well-researched and very specific
policies governing sales of naming rights, most school board
policies refer only in general terms to naming schools after
landmarks or historical figures.78 Sometimes they rely on
community nominations and voting to select names for
buildings or facilities.79 The closest most school boards come
to recognizing sales of naming rights are policies allowing
school facilities to be named after individuals who have
made “contributions” to the schools or community.80 Even
then, it is clear from their wording and application that most
of these policies were drafted to recognize nonfinancial
contributions such as long-standing service. Some school
boards—including a few in North Carolina—do have policies recognizing the possibility of exchanging naming rights
for remuneration, but the vast majority apparently do not.81
This lack of a pre-existing policy raises constitutional
red flags, primarily because it opens school boards up to
charges that they have rejected a particular sponsor based
on disapproval of that sponsor’s viewpoint.82 Some school
78. See, e.g., Durham (N.C.) Public Schools, Regulation 6090,
“Naming Public Schools” (revised 1999): “New schools built in the
Durham Public Schools normally will be named after townships,
regions, or community characteristics.” Available at www.dspnc.net
(search “6090”).
79. See, e.g., Buncombe County Board of Education, Policy # 535
(adopted December 9, 1993), which allows individuals to propose
names to the superintendent, who must obtain the Board of
Education’s “informal approval.” Available at www.buncombe.k12.
nc.us/modules/Downloads/fi les/namschl535ar.pdf.
80. See, e.g., Shenandoah County (Va.) Public Schools, “Naming
School Facilities” (adopted January 14, 1997), www.shenandoah.
k12.va.us/pdf/policymanual/Sec%20F%2005-06.pdf.
81. See, e.g., the policy of the Carteret County (N.C.) Public
School System (revised January 2006), which notes that
“[i]ndividual buildings, rooms or areas within buildings, or other
structure on school campuses may be named in memory or honor
of . . . [a]n individual who has helped students succeed through
significant financial contribution or the donation of personal
property.”
82. Irene Segal Ayers, “What Rudy Hasn’t Taken Credit For: First
Amendment Limits on Regulation of Advertising on Government
Property,” Arizona. Law Review 42, no. 1 (2000): 607, 623–24 (“The
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officials may not believe that having a naming rights policy
is important. Nonetheless, a pre-existing, written policy
gives a school something to point to when claiming that a
decision to reject a sponsor was driven by larger policy concerns, not by animus for the sponsor’s viewpoint. A policy
could even be as simple as the following statement: “In light
of the need to protect student health and encourage healthy
eating, Carolina County schools will not enter into naming
rights arrangements with companies that sell soft drinks.”
A would-be sponsor might argue that it does not fall within
the policy’s scope, but it would find it much harder to claim
viewpoint discrimination if other, similar sponsors are also
excluded.
Of course, a poorly drafted policy could itself raise First
Amendment concerns. Commercial entities might, for
example, challenge a policy that excludes all or some commercial sponsors;83 and religious organizations might do so
if a policy excludes them.84 But even if they are not a failsafe defense, pre-existing naming rights policies undoubtedly carry substantial advantages.

FOLLOWING POLICIES
Simply drawing up a policy governing school naming rights
sales is not enough. To safeguard against First Amendment
challenges, a policy must be followed scrupulously once it is
put in place, a simple enough prescription that governmental actors in other areas have had difficulty following—often
with disastrous results for the government.85
lack of clear, specific, narrowly drafted government standards or
policies that are consistently enforced has often been the problem in
these advertising-on-government-property cases.”).
83. Mary Jean Dolan, “The Special Public Purpose Forum and
Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions of Government
Speech,” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 31 (Winter 2004),
83 (“While a ‘commercial ads only’ policy does block most speech
against public policy, it is an open question whether governments
can further exclude a subset of such speech, typically alcohol and
tobacco ads, where promoting such products contravenes the
administration’s values” (internal citation omitted)).
84. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394.
85. Courts in a number of First Amendment cases have found
that the lack of practical oversight over a policy was sufficient
to create a public forum for free speech. See, e. g., Christ’s Bride
Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 251 (3d
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068 (1999) (“In effect, SEPTA’s
reservation of the right to reject any ad for any reason does not
conclusively show that it intended to keep the forum closed.”);
Planned Parenthood Ass’n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1985) (fi nding that the city
had created a limited public forum—despite its policy banning
“immoral, vulgar, or disreputable” ads—because in practice it failed
to distinguish among advertisers); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass.,
Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 24–25 (1st Cir. 1994)
(finding that it was “exceedingly difficult to say whether the MBTA
designated the interiors of its cars as public fora,” since there was
little evidence in the record about past practice with regard to ad
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In other areas of sponsorship and public-private participation, courts have repeatedly upheld First Amendment
challenges on the grounds that the government—by failing
to police a supposed forum—has (perhaps inadvertently)
created a public forum where restrictions on speech are
nearly impossible to justify.86 The lesson for school boards
is clear: once a naming rights policy is put in place, schools
must be careful to follow its terms.

THE CONTENT OF THE POLICY
A myriad of options are available to school boards preparing to adopt policies on the sale of naming rights. Many
school boards across the country have already opened their
doors to commercial sponsors; others have barred commercial sponsorship altogether; and still others have attempted
to chart a middle course.87
The ultimate content of a naming rights policy—what it
says about which sponsors it will and will not accept—is
a decision that can only be made by school boards themselves. The Constitution does not mandate any particular
decision, and schools are generally free to draw up policies
as they see fit, subject to the First Amendment restrictions
set out above. School officials that adopt a commercial
sponsors-only policy—in an attempt, perhaps, to exclude
religious sponsors—would be wise to familiarize themselves
with commercial speech doctrine, since most sponsor dis-

selection); see also Frayda S. Bluestein, “A Funny Thing Happened
on the Way to the Forum: Free Speech Issues with Government
Websites”) (unpublished manuscript on fi le with author, September
2001), 5.
86. The only acceptable regulations on speech in a public forum
are time, place, and manner restrictions that are viewpoint neutral,
or content-based restrictions that are narrowly drawn to serve a
significant government purpose. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
269–70 (1981).
87. See, e.g., Carteret County (N.C.) Public School System (see
above, note 81); Center. for Commercial-Free Public Education,
“San Francisco Passes the Commercial-Free Schools Act, Not for
Sale” (Spring 2000), www.ibiblio.org/commercialfree/newsletters/
n1300_1.html (last visited July 12, 2006); Citizens’ Campaign for
Commercial-Free Schools, “Corporations Lose Battle for Seattle
Schools,” (November 21, 2001), www.asu.edu/educ/epsl/CERU/
Articles/CERU-0111-060OWI.doc (last visited July 12, 2006).

putes fall under that rubric. As discussed above, challenges
to regulation of commercial speech often rise or fall on the
importance of the government interest asserted. School
boards and their attorneys would therefore also be welladvised to gather evidence about the government interests
served by their restrictions (or, better yet, state them in their
policies). Schools choosing to exercise more control over
their naming rights arrangements—perhaps in an attempt
to win the coveted “government speech” designation—
would do well to make it clear in their written policies
that they consider their schools’ names to be important
forms of expression in their own right.88 Even if this kind
of language does not by itself create government speech,
it may have the added benefit of pushing naming rights
into the same arena as the limited public forum cases that
have upheld schools’ right to regulate speech for curricular
purposes.89

Conclusion
So far, there are no reported cases of would-be sponsors
challenging their exclusion from a school’s naming rights
policy. If school boards are attentive to the concerns raised
in this article, that happy state of affairs may very well
continue. More likely, however, some disgruntled sponsor will seek constitutional redress, as would-be sponsors
in so many other areas of government sponsorship have
done. Sponsors’ successes in those cases suggest that they
may succeed, even in the school naming rights arena, and
that schools could be forced to accept naming rights deals
from unsavory commercial or political groups. This article
has attempted to describe the First Amendment standards
implicated by school naming rights deals so that schools
and their attorneys can formulate policies that guard
against that possibility. ■
88. See, e.g., Rochester City School Board, Policy Manual 75000,
“Naming New Facilities” (revised August 20, 1998), referring to the
curricular value of naming rights. Available at www.rcsdk12.org/
BOE/PM/PM%20pdfs/7000/7500%20Naming%20Facilities.pdf.
89. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276
(1988).
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